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SUBROGEES' STANDING TO SUE UNDER
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
WrITH the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act,' the responsibility for
determining the liability of the United States to its tort claimants was
largely shifted from Congress to the federal courts.2 The lawsuit has sup-
planted the private bill. An important class of tort claims, however, may
continue to lie outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts: the Department
of Justice has consistently maintained that the Act does not permit deriv-
ative suits by an insurer claiming subrogation to a tort action against the
United States.3 The Government's position has usually been rejected on
appeal: of the seven circuit courts of appeal which have considered the ques-
tion, only the Fifth has denied a subrogee the right to sue.4 Resolution of
1. 60 STAT. 843 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 104, 2110, 2401,
2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1948). The provisions of the Tort Claims Act remain substan-
tially unchanged by the revision of the Judicial Code, effective Sept. 1, 1948, Pub. L. N-o.
773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 25, 1948), although all sections were renumiered.
Similar legislation had been enacted by the 70th Congress (11. R. 9285) and the 7(th
Congress (H. R. 7236). The first bill was defeated by President Coolidge's pad:et veto,
the second by the pressure of urgent business which foreclosed Senate action. For a history
of these bills and favorable recommendations for similar action, see H. PL REP. No. 2245,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942). See also, for background material on these early enact-
ments, Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1-45, 129-43, 2258
(1924) and Borchard, Governmaital Responsibility in Tort-A Proposed Stattory Re-
form, 11 A. B. A. J. 495 (1925).
2. Provision had been made previously for suits on claims arising ex contractis, 24
STAT. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §791, 1331-46, 1343, 1351, 1353-7, 1359, 1397,
1399, 1402, 1491-4, 1496, 1501, 1503, 2071, 2072, 2361, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 201, 25,
2509, 2510, 2511 (1948) (Tucker Act) ; for patent infringement, 36 STAT. 851 (1910), as
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1948); for admiralty and maritime torts, 41 STAT. 525
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1946); for damages caused by a public vessel of the United
States, 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1946); and generally for damages non
delictu, 24 STAT. 505 (1837), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2401, 2402 (1943). In the
face of these enactments, it w.as said the "only justification" for the Government's im-
munity from suit sounding in common law tort "seems to be historical." Sn:.. RP. No.
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1946) (recommending passage of the Tort Claims Act).
3. The Government has usually moved to dismiss suits by subrogees on the ground
that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, under FED. R. Crv. P., 12(b) (1).
4. Allowing subrogation: State Farm Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172
F.2d 737 (1st Cir. 1949), reversing Gray v. United States, 77 F.Supp. 869 (D.,\Iass. 1943) ;
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States, 170 F2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943), revCrsing
76 F.Supp. 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1943), cert. granted. 69 S. Ct. 890 (1949) ; Yorkshire Ins. Co. v.
United States, and Home Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F2d 374 (3d Cir. 1948), reversing
Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States, Civil No. 10417, D.N.J., Nov. 13, 1947, and Home Ins.
Co. v. United States, Civil No. 10418, D.N.J., Nov. 13, 1947, cert. granted, 69 S. Ct. &93,
891 (1949) ; United States v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 171 F2d "193 (4th
Cir. 1948), affirming 78 F.Supp. 594 (F.D.S.C. 1948) ; Old Colony Ins. Co. v. United
States, 16S F2d 931 (6th Cir. 1948), revorsing 74 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.Ohio 1947) ; National
American Fire Ins. Co. of Omaha v. United States, 171 F.2d 2C6 (9th Cir. 194S), recvrs-
ing Civil No. 872, S.D.Cal., Nov. 21, 1947; United States v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 171
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this conflict is imminent, for the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two
of these cases.5
Heavily burdened by the time-consuming process of handling countless
bills for private relief, Congress provided in the Act that the district courts
"shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred." 6 Specifically excluded from this
waiver of sovereign immunity are twelve types of claims,7 none of which
F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1948). Subrogee's motion to intervene granted: Employers' Fire In.,
Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948), reversing 74 F.Supp. 669 (S.D.Cal,
1947).
Denying Subrogation: United States v. Hill, 171 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1948), revershig
74 F.Supp. 129 (N.D.Tex. 1947).
5. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States, and Home Ins. Co. v. United States, YI
F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. granted, 69 S. Ct. 890, 891 (1949).
6. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1948). As to the proper forum for suits under the Act:
"Any civil action on a tort claim against the United States . . .may be prosecuted only
in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission com-
plained of occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1948). This phraseology was substituted for
the provision in the original Act that jurisdiction was laid only in those two districts. The
revised provision is probably one of venue. Cf. Hoiness v. United States, 335 U.S. 297
(1948), holding the following provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1946), to relate to venue: "Such suits shall be brought in the
district court of the United States for the district in which the parties so suing, or any of
them, reside or have their principal place of business in the United States, or in which the
vessel or cargo charged with liability is found."
7. "The provisions of ... section 1346 (b) of this title shall not apply to--
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, ex-
ercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute
or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an em-
ployee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of let-
ters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs
duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or
any other law-enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of Title
46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government
in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine
by the United States.
(g) Any claim arising from injury to vessels, or to the cargo, crew, or passengers of
vessels, while passing through the locks of the Panama Canal or while in Canal Zone
waters.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mall-
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concerns subrogation. Unwilling to reimburse insurers who have indemnified
injured policyholders, the Government contends that the "strict construc-
tion" traditionally accorded statutes waiving sovereign immunity dictates
non-recognition of derivative claims because they are not specifically author-
ized. The insurers, however, assert that they deserve recognition because
their claims are not specifically barred while some others are.8 With two
time-honored canons of construction meeting head on, the meaning of the
Act must apparently be sought elsewhere.
The handling of derivative claims prior to the passage of the Act also
provides conflicting indications of intent. On the one hand, subrogation
claims exceeding $1,000, which required a private law for relief, were ap-
parently disfavored by the Congressional Claims Committees and usually
rejected. 9 But more persuasive is the fact that derivative claims which were
cious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interefer-
ence with contract rights.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the
regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces,
or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority." 23
U.S.C. § 2680 (1948).
S. This doctrine of statutory construction-Expressio unirs est exehaso allcrius-is
well recognized. See Rybolt v. Jarrett, 112 F.2d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1940) ; also !0 Art.
Jun. 455 and cases there cited. In addition, Congress has satisfactorily demonstrated in
the past that it can find the requisite language to bar subrogees' suits when it vants to; see
the Foreign Claims Act, 55 STAT. SSO (1942), as amended, 57 STAT. 66 (1943), 31 U.S.C.
§224(d) (1946), as amended, 61 ST.AT. 501 (1947), 31 U.S.C.A. §224(d) (Supp.
1948): "[I]ncluding claims of insured but excluding claims of subrogees."
9. This point, curiously enough, has not been raised by the Government. But it has
been emphatically stated elsewhere:
"The Committees on Claims maintained a rule, from which they seldom deviated,
refusing to compensate on subrogation claims.... If... the... [tortfeasor]
is the government, the insuance company was unable prior to the Tort Act to
recover its subrogation claim in Congress. The usual reason given for denial of
such claims was that insurance companies are paid a premium for assuming risks
while the government is not, and that one who undertakes the risk for profit
should be the one to bear the loss."
Anderson, Recovery from the United States Under the Federal Tort Claitns Act, 31 Mt.
L. Rv. 456, 464-5 (1947). In addition:
".... [it was the policy of Congress not to pay the claims of subrogees by private
relief legislation ... It will thus be seen that the position of subrogees prior to
the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act was quite unsatisfactory."
Morris, Tort Clainms Against the Unitcd States, 19 Omo BAr 487, 490 (1946).
But the existence of such a "rule" or "policy" is questionable. Subrogated insurers
have from time to time obtained relief: Priv. L. No. 430, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dee. 6,
1944) ; Priv. L. No. 529, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 2, 1942) : Priv. L. No. 276, 77th Cong,
2d Sess. (Feb. 16, 1942) ; Priv. L. No. 142, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 30, 1941) ; Priv.
L. No. 222, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Jan. 17, 1940). And the House Committee on Claims
repudiated an anti-subrogation philosophy in one case just prior to the passage of the Tort
Claims Act:
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for $1,000 or less, and consequently eligible for initial settlement by Govern-
mental department heads,1" were always paid by Congress whenever certified
in requests for deficiency appropriations. And in these cases Congress knew
it was paying subrogees.1 ' While this latter action may not be a conclusive
indication of Congressional intent, there is nothing in the history of the Tort
Claims Act to show that Congress even remotely intended to bar the holders
of derivative claims from its benefits.
The Government contends, however, that considerations other than the
Act itself bar actions against the United States by holders of derivative
claims. To allow such suits, it argues, is to jeopardize the procedural pro-
tection afforded the United States by the Assignment of Claims Act 1 and
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the Govern-
ment contends that subrogation constitutes "assignment" within the mean-
ing of the Assignment of Claims Act, which prohibits the assignment of
claims against the United States, and that a subrogee to a tort claim against
the United States is not a "reI party in interest" within the meaning of
Rule 17(a), which requires that all suits shall be prosecuted only "in the
name of the real party in interest."
Both arguments appear to fail on technical as well as practical grounds.
The Assignment of Claims Act has long been held to apply only to voluntary
assignments,' 3 while subrogation is essentially assignment by operation of
law. Furthermore, the purpose of the Assignment of Claims Act was not to
"In view of the fact that the fire insurance companies' right of subrogation is
made a condition for the issuance of the policy, and the fact that subrogation re-
coveries are reflected in the rate level, this committee does not regard the fact
that an insurance company collects a premium for the policy as a sound reason
for excluding the insurance company from the benefits of the Military Claims Act
or a sound reason for Congress to refuse to waive the sovereign immunity of the
United States against proper claims."
H. R. REP. No. 2655, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946). Since the Tort Claims Act was
passed shortly after this report was made, and no further action was taken on the claim,
one may infer that the committee believed recovery could be had under the Act.
10. Under the Small Tort Claims Act, 42 STAT. 1066, which was repealed with passage
of the present Act.
11. The propriety of derivative claims in this latter category was once questioned when
the Treasury Department, upon being asked to settle an insurer's claim administratively,
requested a ruling from the Attorney General. He replied that while the Veterans Ad-
ministration and the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and War had refused to com-
pensate subrogees, the Post Office, Navy, and Labor Departments had settled such claims
without reference to subrogation and had always obtained the necessary funds from Con-
gress with which to pay them. Accordingly, he recommended that such claims in the
future be settled up with subrogees and then certified to Congress, clearly labelled,
so that "legislative action amounting to a conclusive legislative construction" might be
obtained. 36 Ors. ATIY GEN. 553, 559 (1932). They have been paid ever since.
12. REv. STAT. § 3447 (1908), as amended, 54 STAT. 1029 (1940), 31 U.S.C. §203
(1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 501 (1947), 31 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 1948).
13. Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469, 473 (1920); Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S, 410,
423-5 (1899) ; Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U.S. 556, 560 (1880) ; Erwin v. United States,
97 U.S. 392, 397 (1878). 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACricE 1337 n.7 (2d ed. 1948).
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limit the liability of the United States-a purpose for which the Government
would invoke it here' 4-- but rather to make it easy for the United States to
assert counterclaims and set-offs against an original claimant. These rights
of the United States as a defendant are partially secured by Rule 17(a), and
wholly secured by the Tort Claims Act itself, for the jurisdiction which it
grants to hear claims also includes jurisdiction over counterclaims and set-
offs which the Government wishes to raise against any party, plaintiff suing
under the Act.'5
The Government's argument on Rule 17(a) seems to be that a subrogee
should not be permitted to sue because the United States might thereby be
forced, contrary to the provisions of the Tort Claims Act, to appear in court
twice on the same cause of action, either to defend a subsequent suit by the
subrogor, or to assert a counterclaim or set-off against him. But none of
these difficulties need arise if Rule 17(a) is properly construed. If the insurer
is a full subrogee, he is the only real party in interest, and a suit by the sub-
rogor should be dismissed."6 In the case of partial subrogation insured and
insurer are both real parties in interest 17 and either may sue.'5 On the Gov-
14. A similar attempt to limit the liability of the United States was made in Price v.
Forrest, note 13 supra, where the Government tried unsuccessfully to bar the prosecution
of a claim against the United States by a receiver to whom a court with proper jurisdic-
tion had ordered that the claim be assigned.
15. "The jurisdiction conferred by this section [1346(b)] includes jurisdiction of any
set-off, counterclaim, or other claim or demand whatever on the part of the United States
against any plaintiff commencing an action under this section." 28 U.S.C. 3 1346(c)
(1948). As to the right of an obligor to counterclaim or set-off against an assignee, see
generally REsTATXEEmE, CoxmTAcrs § 167 (1932).
16. See, on subrogation aspects, CLmu, LAw or CODE Pmzn=m § 24 (2d ed. 1947)
and 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 1346-51 (2d ed. 1948). Briefly, the purpse of the "real
party in interest" provision is to force prosecution in the name of the party having the
substantive right to be enforced. CLAn., § 22; 3 Mcon,, at 1305. Where the insured has
been fully compensated for his loss, he has no such right; it has passed to the insurer.
It is assumed in this Note that subrogation is part of the substantive law of the state
where the actionable wrong was committed. If this were not so, the United States would
seem to be immune from suits by subrogees simply because the Tort Claims Act pro-
vides for federal liability only "[u]nder circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant.. !' 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1948). If, however,
state law should permit the insurer to sue, but only in the name of the injured party-a
construction of the "real party in interest" code provision which Professor Moore and
Judge Clark believe to be erroneous-there would seem to be nothing to bar him from
suing in his ow z name in the fedcral courts, particularly where the right to be enforced is
a federal one. This in no way affects the right to subrogation, which is part of the sub-
stantive, not adjective law; it merely requires that suit be brought in the name of the
party entitled to keep the proceeds. The Government has at least partially conceded the
validity of this argument: "While the question of whether an actionable wrong has oc-
curred is controlled by state law, the question as to whose name the action must be filed in
is procedural and must be determined by the law of the forum.' Supplemental Brief of
Appellant, p. 8, United States v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 171 F2d 893 (4th
Cir. 1948).
17. The insurer to the extent of indemnification; the injured party to the ex\tent that
he remains unreimbursed.
18. Williams v. Powers, 2 FED. Rums DEc. 362 (N.D.Ohio 1941) ; 3 Mo.-, Fnm2AL
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ernment's motion, however, either party as individual plaintiff may be
compelled to join the other to prevent dismissal of the suit.9 Thus the
United States could suffer no procedural disadvantages, except in the pecul-
iar situation where it wished to assert a counterclaim or set-off greater than
the amount recoverable in the main action and the injured party could not
be joined in that action on a partial subrogation theory."0 In such case, the
injured party should be denominated an indispensable party plaintiff,"1
and his presence before the court required if the action is to proceed.2
Hence the United States should always be able fully to adjudicate its rights
in one action.
PRAcrncE 1348 (2d ed. 1948). Should the injured party sue, however, the insurer may
intervene. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948);
Williams v. Powers, mepra. FED. R. Civ. P., 24.
19. State Farm Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 737, 739 (1st
Cir. 1949) ; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 1348, 44-5 (2d ed. 1948). FED. R. Civ. P., 19(a).
And the Government need not worry about how the joinder is accomplished: it is the
subrogee's business to choose the proper forum initially and to produce the injured party if
his presence be required. Should the injured party in such a case be uncooperative, tle
insurer might possibly make him a defendant or an involuntary plaintiff. For a discussion
of these procedural devices, see 3 Moore, FEDERAL PRAcricE 2144-55 (2d ed. 1948).
20. If the counterclaim were less than the original claim, only the difference would be
recoverable and the presence of the insured unnecessary. But it is possible that the sub-
rogee's right of action might be defeated entirely and no part of the counterclaim paid in
the principal action. The Government would then be forced to sue the injured party in a
second action, which would deprive the first forum of its jurisdiction over counterclaims
arising from the original suit and thereby conflict with the expressed provisions of the
Act. The problem was first mentioned in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States,
170 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1948), where Judge Frank, speaking for the court, found the "fa-
vored situation of the government" with respect to counterclaims to conflict with "the
reiterated requirement that we should treat the United States like a private individual.
- . ." In adopting the latter as "more fundamental," the court said, "We think ... the
Congress did not intend to limit the jurisdiction of the district courts more than it its
limited by the specific exceptions." Id. at 472. But the counterclaim was not an issue in
the case except as the court made it one; on that ground judge Learned Hand, concurring
in part, refused to rule on the point. And there are alternatives to the court's solution:
see text accompanying note 21 infra.
In any case, while the discussion of counterclaims may be merited, it seems extremely
unlikely that the Government will ever have a set-off to assert against a subrogatcd plain-
tiff-insurer. To that extent, imaginary horribles which may result if a set-off does arise
should probably not weigh heavily in construing the Act for the vast majority of cases.
21. The indispensable party concept is flexible. The general rule appears to be that
"[h]is presence is required in order that the court may make an adjudication equitable to
all persons involved." 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 2145 (2d ed. 1948). If it must be
assumed, as has here been assumed throughout, that the Government must never be forced
to litigate a cause of action twice even though a private party might have to under similar
circumstances, then the injured party must under the conditions described in the text be
denominated an indispensable party simply because the Tort Claims Act requires it. This
solution does not tamper with accepted notions as to parties, and seems reasonable here
because the Government's alternative theory goes out of its way to create a conflict be-
tween the Act and the Federal Rules.
22. "Of course, if indispensable parties are not and cannot be joined, the court cannot
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Aside from procedural objections to the recognition of derivative claims,
it has been argued that permitting an insurer to recover on a federal tort
claim would in effect be giving the insurer a windfall, since a premium has
been received for bearing the risk of the loss for which it seeks recovery.3
But this theory in turn is based upon the dual assumption that insurance rates
are not geared to allow for recovery from a tortfeasor, and that an insurer
would treat the amount recovered as "profit" rather than reduce insurance
rates accordingly. If the assumption is true, the argument should be directed
against faulty rate structures, 2 not the principle of subrogation. Taxpayers,
not policyholders, should bear financial losses occasioned by Government
tortfeasance.
Whatever the technical and policy arguments involved, upholding the
Government's position would seem to do little more than force insurers to
redraft their policies to protect themselves. Two means have been pointed
out whereby they could effect recovery even if they could not sue for them-
selves: payment to the insured could be made contingent upon his suing
the United States, or the insurer could make the indemnification as a loan
and subsequently sue the United States in the name of the insured. - There
is no readily apparent reason for encouraging such devices by disallowing
derivative claims.
For a statute waiving sovereign immunity, the phraseology of the Tort
Claims Act is unusually comprehensive in setting out the liability of the
United States as identical to that of a private party. To defeat this broad
assumption of liability, the Government has mustered an ancient canon of
construction easily counterbalanced by another of equal applicability, and
a trio of technical and public policy arguments which appear clearly unsound.
Not only does it seem proper to include subrogation claims within the
scope of the Act as a matter of statutory interpretation; in terms of practical
proceed; it cannot enter an equitable judgment in the cause." 3 MoURE, Fr ZVL PRAcTc
2205 (2d ed. 1948). Again it is the subrogcc's problem to produce the injured party. See
note 19 supra. As a practical matter, insurers would probably make the injured party sue
to recover on his policy if he were unwilling to assist them in prosecuting the tortfeasor to
recover back the loss.
23. See note 9 supra.
24. As a result of the decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Aso-
ciation, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), which held insurance to be interstate commerce, tie Fed-
eral Government is now in a position to attack such faulty rate structures if and w.'here
they exist. Indeed, subsequent Congressional enactments demand state action if federal
regulation of insurers is to be avoided. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1946);
59 STAT. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §1012 (1946), as amended, 61 ST=T. 443 (1947), 15
U.S.C.A. § 1012 (Supp. 1948).
25. Bryan, J., in Ins. Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 951, 953
(D.Va. 1948). The making of such a loan, even when receipted, has no effect on the in-
jured party's right to sue. Augusta Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 170 F.2d 159 (5th
Cir. 1948). An analogy may be drawn bet-'een these devices and those employed by in-
surers of railroad shippers to protect themselves from losses occasioned by carrier negli-
gence toward goods in transit. See Campbell, Non-Consens'al Surelyship, 45 YAI= L. 3.
69, 83-4 (1935).
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